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PUBLIC CONNECTION THROUGH MEDIA CONSUMPTION: 
BETWEEN OVERSOCIALIZATION AND DESOCIALIZATION? 
 
NICK COULDRY AND TIM MARKHAM, LONDON SCHOOL OF 
ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
This chapter reviews the ongoing contribution of Personal Influence  to our 
understanding of media’s social consequences from the perspective of recent research 
(the London school of Economics ‘Public Connection’ project, 2003-2006, conducted by 
the authors and Sonia Livingstone) into the extent to which shared habits of media 
consumption help sustain, or not, UK citizens’ orientation to a public world. As well as 
reviewing specific findings of the Public Connection project that intersect with themes of 
Personal Influence  (particularly on citizens’ networks of social interaction and the 
available discursive contexts in which they can put their mediated knowledge of the 
public world to use), the chapter reviews the methodological similarities and differences 
between this recent project and that of Katz and Lazarsfeld. The result, the authors 
conclude, is to confirm the continued salience of the questions about the social 
embeddedness of media influences that Katz and Lazarsfeld asked. 
 
[8737 words inc notes and references] 
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PUBLIC CONNECTION THROUGH MEDIA CONSUMPTION: 
BETWEEN OVERSOCIALIZATION AND DESOCIALIZATION? 
NICK COULDRY AND TIM MARKHAM 
 
‘We are suggesting  . . . that the response of an individual . . . cannot be accounted 
for without reference to his social environment and to the character of his 
interpersonal relations’ (Katz, Lazarsfeld et al. 1955: 25) 
 
‘Part of us is immersed in world culture, but, because there is no longer a public 
space where social norms could be formed and applied, another part of us retreats 
into hedonism or looks for a sense of belonging that is more immediate . . . both 
individuals and groups are therefore less and less defined by the social relations 
which until now defined the field of sociology, whose goal was to explain 
behaviour in terms of the social relations in which actors were involved’ (Touraine 
2000: 5-6) 
 
[para altered] Katz and Lazarsfeld’s Personal Influence was a major step forward in our 
understanding of ‘media’ as complex processes of mediation. By asking about the 
contribution of ‘person-to-person communication’ to the circulation of media-sourced 
information and opinion (1955: 1),  Katz and Lazarsfeld marked a shift away from a 
research paradigm dominated by a concern with media’s rhetorical power over ‘masses’1 
towards a more fine-grained account of how media messages filter through the intricate 
networks of social life. From this perspective, perhaps, the fact that the influences they 
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chose to track specifically were largely banal and short-term (choice of a fashion or a 
movie, an opinion about a current news story) rather than major and long-term (the 
adoption of values, or political allegiances) was potentially an advantage, since it 
prioritized the question of how media have social consequences in the ordinary run of 
things. This emphasis remains important. It is reflected in recent theorizations of 
mediation’s social consequences over the longer-term (Silverstone 2005).2 More than 
that, Katz and Lazarsfeld’s famous two-step flow thesis, by ruling out of court the old 
paradigm of ‘a radio listener shut up in his room with a self-sufficient supply of the world 
outside’ (1955: 40) (what we might call the ‘plugged-in monad’ model: Couldry 2004), 
remains a useful ally as and when that model gets revived in new circumstances.3  If, 
more broadly, the battle continues against mediacentric accounts4 which frame media’s 
social consequences upon terms set principally by an examination of media’s own 
outputs (considered to the exclusion of the vast range of other inputs into contemporary 
life), then we must remember that battle was begun with Personal Influence.  
 
The wider significance of the book, however, extends beyond communications research. 
Nicholas Garnham (2000) recently has argued that communications’ contribution to the 
feasibility of large-scale democracies is a question at the heart of Enlightenment debates 
and Katz and Lazarsfeld claimed almost as long a lineage when they started their book 
with an epigraph from John Stuart Mill:  
 
And what is a still greater novelty, the mass do not now take their opinions from 
dignitaries in church or State, from ostensible leaders, or from books. Their thinking is 
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done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their 
name, on the spur of the moment (Mill, On Liberty, quoted in (Katz, Lazarsfeld et al. 
1955) 
 
In so doing Katz and Lazarsfeld framed their account of how the mechanism of mass 
media influences daily life within a longer history of liberal inquiry into how democratic 
citizens come to feel part of a wider polity.5 In the context of democratic theory (not only 
liberal but also republican), unlike the early communications research, everyday talk and 
discussion is a central, not an incidental, focus for those concerned with the possibility of 
effective democracy.  And that interest in the political and civic significance of talk is a 
thread through the later work of Elihu Katz and those who have worked with him 
(Eliasoph 1998; Wyatt, Katz et al. 2000) 
 
While Katz and Lazarsfeld’s contribution to the history of mediation research is assured 
and unproblematic, things are less straightforward when we consider Personal 
Influence’s place in the history of democratic theory and political science. For, as the 
opening quote illustrates, Katz and Lazarsfeld’s rightful emphasis (in the context of 
communications research) on the social contexts in which media messages are received 
can appear within that second perspective to rest on an assumption – in 1955 probably 
fully justified, but now open to question – about the fit between the worlds we learn of 
through media (once, perhaps, they have been further mediated by local opinion-formers) 
and the spaces in which we regularly act. Yet it is exactly this fit, or certainly its 
naturalness, that the French sociologist Alain Touraine challenges in his account of what 
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might be wrong in the contemporary polity. In Touraine’s account (so different from that 
of Gabriel Tarde who had inspired Katz), any local mediation of media messages is 
absent, and the resulting dislocation threatens any sense of belonging to a democratic 
society.  
 
While by no means every commentator would agree with Touraine’s pessimism 
(Schudson 1998), there is certainly a theoretical head-of-steam behind it, especially given 
the background of wider fears about declining voter turnout and declining trust in 
political institutions in ‘advanced’ democracies. For Zygmunt Bauman (1999) it is the 
‘bridges’ between private and public worlds that are missing, undermining the very 
possibility of democratic politics in an excessively ‘individualised’ society (Bauman 
2001). While Putnam’s (2000) detailed concerns are with the decline of interpersonal 
trust and network resources rather than with how people interpret the world directly or 
indirectly through media, the Bowling Alone thesis certainly laments the absence of the 
taken-for-granted informal exchanges that Katz and Lazarsfeld themselves saw 
expanding, not diminishing.6 More broadly, the idea that the worlds of knowledge and 
experience made available through mass media might be in conflict with, not harmonized 
with, the everyday lifeworld [phrase altered] was foreshadowed by Robert Merton’s 
(1938) classic study of anomie before World War II,7 but has found many echoes since in 
accounts both of media and of the scale of social life in general (Meyrowitz 1985; Beck 
2000; Urry 2000).8 
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All this gives a continued, if controversial, relevance to Katz and Lazarfeld’s wide-angled 
view of how mass media messages are themselves mediated by the structures and flows 
of local opinion.  
 
Introducing the Public Connection project 
 
Against this background, we want to discuss some material generated by what, on the 
face of it, is a very different empirical project from Katz and Lazarfeld’s, in spite of 
certain similarities. Like Personal Influence, the UK ‘Public Connection’ project9 (in 
which we have been involved with our colleague Sonia Livingstone since October 2003) 
was started against a background of doubts (in our case, a recent revival of older doubts) 
about media’s contribution to the very basis of democratic engagement; we also shared 
with Katz and Lazarsfeld the sense that the only way forward was to study what people 
do and think on a daily basis in specific contexts that are only partly shaped by media 
themselves. But our project differed in focus, method and context.  
 
The comparison with Personal Influence 
 
Our focus was on the broad, some might say recklessly broad, question of whether, and 
under what conditions, people across both genders, all classes and ages, are orientated, if 
at all, towards a public world beyond the private, and, if so, to what extent their media 
consumption helps sustain that orientation.  
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As to method, our primary data-gathering device was the self-produced diary produced in 
the context of an ongoing many-month relationship between the project and diarist, 
whereas Katz and Lazarsfeld’s was a highly structured survey questionnaire [new 
phrase] (see below for a more detailed reflection on our methodological choices). Since 
we researched right across England, and since the diary process was extremely labour-
intensive on the part of our research team, only a relatively small number of diarists (37) 
was feasible, although we balanced this at the end of our project with a nationwide survey 
(1000 respondents). By contrast, Katz and Lazarsfeld’s initial survey was administered to 
a large (800) but spatially very concentrated population. Our project however shared with 
Katz and Lazarsfeld’s the issue of ‘confirmation’: just as Katz and Lazarsfeld did not rely 
on people’s statements (in their initial survey) of who influenced them, but sought to 
corroborate these with a follow-up survey of those alleged to influence, so we never 
intended to rely on the diaries as primary data in isolation; our plan was always to follow-
up the diary with a reflexive semi-structured interview with the diarist (which was also 
able to pick up the threads of our initial interview before the diary had started). 
 
As to context, the world of Decatur, Illinois in 1945 described by Katz and Lazarsfeld, 
where on many issues local people seemed happy to leave the flow of national media to 
be mediated, in turn, by local opinion ‘leaders’ before it reached them (1955: 314), seems 
a world away from early 21st century Britain with its universally available campaigning 
national press, still prominent national terrestrial television and radio channels, and 
general sense of ‘media-saturation’. How far the different outcomes of the two projects 
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are attributable to intercountry difference or common historical shifts in media density is 
something we will have a chance to assess when results are available from the parallel 
US study, based at the Institute of Communication Research, University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign and directed by Bruce Williams and Andrea Press.10 At fifty years’ 
distance, we cannot expect the framing of our results to do more than partially overlap 
with Katz and Lazarsfeld’s inquiry. To the extent that they do so, however, we hope to 
demonstrate the continued salience of their pathbreaking questions.  
 
Our research question 
 
Our research question in the ‘Public Connection’ project is best explained in terms of two 
connected and widely made assumptions about democratic politics that we have been 
trying to ‘test’: First, in a ‘mature’ democracy such as Britain, most people share an 
orientation to a public world where matters of common concern are, or at least should be, 
addressed (we call this orientation ‘public connection’). Second, this public connection is 
focussed principally on mediated versions of that public world (so that ‘public 
connection’ is principally sustained by a convergence in what media people consume, in 
other words, by shared or overlapping shared media consumption). 
 
These assumptions are detachable from each other. Some believe the first without the 
second, because they argue public connection is unlikely to served by people’s use of 
media (Robert Putnam’s (2000) well-known Bowling Alone thesis takes that position in 
relation to television). Generally however it seems to us that many writers assume both, 
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even if only tacitly - or at least that is our contention (there is no space to defend our view 
of the literature here). Consequently, our concern is with the empirical question: can we 
find evidence for those assumptions in UK citizens’ practice? 
 
[para altered] The first assumption is important because it underlies most models of 
democracy: informed consent to political authority requires that people’s attention to the 
public world can be assumed, or at least one can assume an orientation to the public 
world which from time to time results in actual attention. To be clear, no one believes 
that more than a small elite is continuously attentive to the world of politics, or indeed 
should be. But there is an underlying assumption – as we see it, political science’s 
‘bottom line’ – that most people are broadly oriented in the direction of public matters so 
that, at certain times, they are in a position to pay specific attention either to traditional 
electoral politics or to broader public issues that have become contentious.11 Put crudely, 
if this is not the case and people are facing the other way, then no amount of skilled 
political communication will reach them!  
 
More specifically, when in this project we talk of ‘public’ connection, we mean ‘things or 
issues which are regarded as being of shared concern, rather than of purely private 
concern’, matters that in principle citizens need to discuss in a world of limited shared 
resources. The word ‘public’ is, of course, notoriously difficult, since it has a range of 
conflicting meanings (Weintraub and Kumar, 1997), but there is no space to debate this, 
or defend our particular usage, here: for more details, see Couldry Livingstone and 
Markham (forthcoming), and cf Geuss (2001) and Elshtain (1997).  
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We have been careful not to assume that a decline in attention to ‘politics’ in the 
traditional sense means lack of attention to ‘politics’ in general, let alone apathy. People’s 
understanding of what constitutes politics may be changing  (Bennett 1998; Axford 
2001). The media landscape that may enable public connection is also changing. The 
multiplication and intense interlinking of media and media formats through digital 
convergence may lead to an intensification of public connection, as people become more 
skilful at adapting their media consumption to suit their everyday habits and pressures. Or 
it may lead to the fragmentation of the public sphere into a mass of specialist 
‘sphericules’ (Gitlin 1998) that can no longer connect sufficiently to form a shared public 
world. In this context, the question of where and how, and for what purpose, talk oriented 
to a public world occurs (including talk that might fit within the theoretical model of a 
public sphere) becomes crucial. 
 
Our working assumption, then, is that the public/private boundary remains meaningful in 
spite of many other levels of disagreement over the content and definition of politics. But 
our understanding of the public/private boundary is not prescriptive. The point of our 
research has been to ask people: what makes up their public world? How are they 
connected to that world? And how are media involved, or not, in sustaining that 
connection to a public world (as they understand it)?  
 
[title altered] Methodological reflection 
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These are the questions we aimed to explore: first by asking a small group of 37 people to 
produce a diary for 3 months during 2004 that reflected on those questions; second by 
interviewing those diarists, both before and after their diary production, individually and 
in some cases also in focus-groups; and finally by broadening out the themes from this 
necessarily small group to a nationwide survey (targeted at a sample of 1000 
respondents) conducted in June 2005. The survey provided data on media consumption, 
attitudes to media and politics, and public actions, and also the contexts in which all of 
these occur. 
 
Our 37 diarists were evenly split across gender and three age categories (between 18 and 
69). We aimed indirectly for a wide socioeconomic range through two strategies: first, by 
recruiting in 6 contrasting regions (poor inner city London, mid-income suburban 
London, poor inner city South of England, prosperous suburbs of two Northern England 
cities, and a mixed-income rural area in the Midlands); and, second, through recruiting 
people with varying levels of media access in each region. As a result, we achieved a 
broad span from single mothers living on limited incomes in London public housing to 
retired financial services executives. Men aged between 30 and 50 were difficult to 
recruit as were both genders in Class D (unskilled manual labour), but we achieved a 
good range of home media access (broadly tracking then current UK national averages). 
There were nine non-white diarists, an over-representation demographically but 
important to ensure a range of views in relation to Britain’s overwhelmingly white 
political culture. 
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[para altered] The diaries were produced weekly for up to three months. We encouraged 
open reflection and avoided specific signals as to what people were to comment on. The 
diary data are particularly complex , our intention always being that the diary material 
would be ‘triangulated’ by interview data. For ease of exposition, we will draw mainly 
from the interview data in this chapter. Crucial to our method was combining self-
produced data – tracing respondents’ own reflections as they developed under the 
pressures of everyday life and alongside changing public events – and semi-structured 
interviews, conducted not just in advance of the diaries but after their completion, when 
the diarists could be invited to reflect on the accuracy and meaning of their reflections. 
Our idea, against the grain of so much political science that is exclusively based on 
dominated by survey methodology, was that we needed to listen to respondents’ own 
voices produced and recorded in their own time, if we were to get  a sense of what it 
‘feels like’ to be a citizen in contemporary Britain, or not as the case may be.12 
 
[new para] It is worth, however, reflecting here a little more on our method in the spirit 
of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s own methodological reflections in Personal Influence. Our 
choice of the diary method as a key component in our multi-method study inevitably has 
a context and brings with it certain constraints. As a choice, it was informed most 
generally by an awareness of the concern with individual reflexivity in some strands of 
cultural studies research (compare Couldry 2000: chapters 3 and 7) and also by the broad 
precedent of the UK’s Mass Observation study, started in the 1930s and still continuing 
to this date. Indeed in our pilot research, we used alongside semi-structured interviews 
the setting of questions to the current panel of Mass-Observation diarists (Couldry and 
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Langer 2005).13 We were well aware, however, of the potential for self-delusion in this 
attempt to ‘get close’ to respondents’ own voices, and our approach was from the outset 
informed by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1998) critique of scholastic authority, and its tendency to 
forget the institutional privileges built into the very possibility of academics’ view of the 
social world  as an object of research.14 We knew that our data would be shaped by the 
power relationships between respondents and us (as representatives of a well-known 
academic institution) that had shaped its very production. For that reason, we looked for 
traces of those power relations in the diary and interview data. But we realized that, in the 
end, such influences cannot be avoided; indeed Bourdieu argues it is one of the key 
delusions of academic research to think that they can! Instead our aim was to look at 
diarists’ accounts of their lives from more than one angle (including the retrospective 
interview) in the hope that certain distortions could be noted and, so far as possible, 
factored out. To this extent, there was some similarity between our methodological 
concerns and those of Personal Influence  even if our specific methods  were rather 
different.  
 
Politics and public affairs as a special case 
 
In pursuing any comparison between our project and Personal Influence, there is one 
further important limiting factor that must be borne in mind. This is the distinctiveness,  
within the wider field of personal influence, of politics and public affairs. This for us was 
part of our primary focus, but it was only one of four areas in Katz and Lazarsfeld’s 
 15
study, which covered (1955: 4) ‘daily household marketing’, ‘fashion’, ‘attendance at 
movies’ and as well as ‘formation of opinion on local public affairs’ (note the restriction).  
 
More interestingly, Katz and Lazarsfeld make very clear that the area of ‘local public 
affairs’ was the ‘outlier’ in their argument. ‘Public affairs’, they report, is the only area 
where social status (as opposed to life-cycle) dominates your chances of being an 
opinion-leader (1955: 273, 323-324). In addition, although public affairs are in principle 
an area whose context affects both genders in their capacity as voting citizens, influence 
over opinions was, they found, heavily gendered: indeed this was the only area where, it 
seemed, men’s opinions heavily influenced (or at least were reported by women to 
influence) women’s opinions (1955: 276). While the relevance of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s 
study is limited by the fact it was only women who they researched, their conclusion is an 
important one: ‘better educated, wealthier women – that is, women of higher status, no 
matter what their life-cycle position – seem to move in a climate which promotes greater 
participation in public affairs [than women of lower status]’ (1955: 295). 
 
 
The Public Connection survey 
 
There is no space here to discuss in detail the results of our nationwide survey 
administered on our behalf across the UK during the weekend of 3-5 June 2005 by ICM 
Research. Here we will concentrate on two essential points: stratification and the 
discursive context for following the world of news. 
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Although in our survey and throughout our project, we deliberately used the term ‘public’ 
in a broad way (covering not just traditional politics or ‘public affairs’ but the much 
wider space of ‘issue’ politics), we found broadly the same stratification of political and 
news engagement as Katz and Lazarsfeld, with the additional factor of age stratification 
suggesting perhaps, as many believe, that the levels of engagement found in 1945 
Decatur are also historically quite distinct from those of the contemporary period.15   
 
Our respondents overwhelmingly report that watching the news is important and a regular 
practice for them, while also agreeing that there is often too much media and that politics 
is too complicated. However age makes a difference: a feeling of duty to follow the news 
increases with age, as do practices of regular news consumption and understanding of 
issues. As to class, those from what in the UK are called [explanatory note added] 
C2DE households16 exhibit a distinctly higher tendency to agree that there is no point in 
following the news, that politics is too complicated and that they have no influence over 
political decisions. Men are more likely to say they have a good understanding of issues 
and actively compared news sources, while more women than men agree that politics is 
too complicated to understand. People from ABC1 households (see note 15) tend overall 
to find media relevant, and agree that different sources of news give different accounts of 
events, while those from C2DE households are more likely to agree that media are 
irrelevant to their lives. Respondents over 55 and from ABC1 households are far more 
likely to agree that they know where they could find the information they needed about 
issues important to them. Gender and class therefore intersect to stratify the practice of 
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following public matters, with signs that a specific, and disadvantaged, group has 
switched off more decisively. Looking from the other side of the equation, those who are 
disengaged from politics, as measured by their response to the prompt ‘Politics has little 
connection with your life’, are more likely to be of lower socioeconomic status, and to 
have left full-time education at an earlier age than those who disagree with the same 
prompt. Significantly, those who are disengaged from politics are very likely also to 
agree that the media cover issues that have little to do with their lives, and exhibit lower 
media literacy, measured by their likelihood to compare different sources of information. 
 
What about talk in our survey? We asked respondents to indicate whom they spoke to 
both about issues in general, and about a particular issue that they named as currently the 
most important to them. Levels of discussion are high: 85 percent of respondents say they 
regularly talk to friends and 72 percent to family about issues. If we exclude those 
unemployed or past retirement age, gender is a predictor with men considerably more 
likely than women to report talking to colleagues about issues. Taking this same group 
and looking at their talk with family and friends, we found that an interest in traditional 
politics or issues is associated with reporting discussion about issues with friends. 
 
This broad evidence of a discursive context for thinking about public issues is supported 
by other data. Respondents were asked if they thought their friends or colleagues would 
expect them to keep up with the main issues of the day. With a correlation of r=.157, age 
is the strongest demographic predictor of social expectation, but newspaper readership 
and using the internet as a news source are also significantly correlated. Perhaps more 
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importantly, people who cite social expectation are more likely to follow traditional 
politics (r=.479) and social issues (r=.388) rather than celebrity (r=-.052); they are also 
likely to have higher levels of media literacy, and, interestingly, are significantly more 
likely to vote (r=.210). This demonstrates clearly that the availability of some form of 
discursive context in which issues are discussed (and in which a level of proficiency is 
expected) is an important determining factor, if not for public action as such (beyond the 
minimal action of voting), then certainly for engagement with the public world. Most 
people report having at least one context in which they discuss issues: overall, 85% talk 
to friends, 73% to family and 55% to colleagues at work,17 about the issues that interest 
them. Women are more likely (r=.088) to talk to family members, and men are more 
likely (r=.117) to talk to people at work about these issues.  
 
The Public Connection diary data 
 
Although the main questions of our project were with media consumption and people’s 
overall orientation to a public world, we were interested also from the outset in the 
context for such orientation provided (or not) by everyday talk.18  
 
Scale of social interactions 
 
First, however, we want to introduce one further, demographically inflected factor which, 
given the local focus of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s study, is not prioritized there, although it is 
implied in their very distinction between opinion leaders (who have wider links to the 
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world) and others. This is the variation between people in scale of social interactions in 
which they are regularly involved. 
 
Although inevitably the distinctions that can be made here are to some degree intuitive, 
we considered how our diarists differed in the scale of social interactions regularly 
desfrcibed in their diaries and interviews: ranging from local neighbourhood (local 
streets/ village, small area of London), to local area (nearby villages, town, broad area of 
London), to national (including the metropolis London as a whole), to international. The 
results were interesting. There were seven diarists whose social interactions seemed from 
their own account to be largely limited to their local neighbourhood and nineteen to their 
local area, nine had regular social interactions on a national scale, and only two could be 
said to have regular social interactions on an international scale.   
 
Clearly there is potentially a link between one’s scale of social interactions and the way 
one’s opinions are influenced and perhaps if Personal Influence were being repeated 
today - in an age of considerable, although still highly uneven levels of travel in everyday 
life – this would be investigated. Since we didn’t ask directly about opinion formation, 
we cannot resolve that point, but one implication of people’s scale of social interactions 
is striking.  
 
In our wider analysis (for detailed background, see Couldry Livingstone and Markham 
forthcoming chapter 4), we found an important distinction between diarists we call 
‘public world connectors’ and those we call ‘media world connectors’. For the former, 
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the public world emerges principally out of their media consumption, whereas the latter’s 
orientation to a public world is something which they bring to media and which further 
orientates their use of media (that is, they have an involvement with a public world 
independently of their media consumption). We make no value judgment of course about 
which is the ‘better’ type of ‘mediated public connection’ (in our term), and many people 
fall somewhere between these two possibilities (we call them ‘multiple connectors’). In 
addition, there are other people we call ‘weak connectors’ who had no strong orientation 
either to a media world or a public world. But the distribution of public world connectors, 
media world connectors, multiple connectors, and weak connectors bears an interesting 
relationship to variations in people’s scale of social interactions.  
 
Those diarists whose social interactions are largely at a neighbourhood level are unlikely 
to be public world connectors and likely instead to be either weakly connected or 
bidirectional. By contrast those 2 diarists whose social interactions were regularly on an 
international scale, were both public world connectors and those whose social 
interactions were on a national scale were more likely to be public world connectors than 
anything else. (Those linked to their broader locality showed no particular pattern.) 
[sentence altered] In a tentative way, therefore, this supports the link Katz and 
Lazarsfeld imply between ‘gregariousness’ (defined in part by the scale of your social 
interactions beyond immediate neighbours: 1955: 227) and the way in which you orient 
yourself to the world through media (‘opinion leadership’ in public affairs being linked 
both to gregariousness and to a great breadth of media consumption).19 
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Talk about public issues 
 
Most of our diarists reported to us in various ways on how they discussed with others 
public issues (in the broadest sense, that is, the type of issues they mentioned in their own 
diary): only four diarists appeared to have no discursive context sustaining their media 
consumption and possibly public orientation. To this extent, our data suggests some 
continuity with Katz and Lazarsfeld’s emphasis on talk within social networks, rather 
than support for Touraine’s more drastic ‘desocialisation’ thesis.  
 
We found, disappointingly often, evidence of a gendered authority structure in how 
people formed their opinions on public matters, similar to that Katz and Lazarsfeld found. 
Most often this was in couples (with the male partner bringing home the daily paper for 
the female partner), but sometimes (among our younger respondents) it was produced 
across generations by the traditional ‘paterfamilias’ figure: 
He sort of explains it all to me and still it makes no sense, waste of time. (Kylie, 24, 
unemployed, urban London Southeast)  
No, I mean as soon as I sit down to read the paper, like I say, my partner reads it at 
work and he’ll come in flipping pages and say, look at that story and drive you mad 
cause I just sat down to try and read it myself and he’ll say look at that. (Andrea, 25, 
nurse, Midlands rural) 
Well, dad’s very willing to explain the stuff, it’s just, I don't know, he, he’s very very 
willing to explain but then he kind of puts stuff in when you know he just goes off on 
one. (Mary, 18, medical student, Northern suburb) 
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In one case, a diarist tells of talking to her son in a manner which reproduces the 
gendering but reverses the direction of generational influence: 
My son studied Media at school and college so I spent some time discussing 
advertising with him today.  He made me realise that I don’t think enough about 
information. (Jane, 52, supermarket assistant, Urban South) 
 
As to where people talked, most people talked across the same range of contexts as was 
evidenced in the survey: 24 mention talking to their friends specifically about issues, 20 
to their families and 15 to people at work. Work contexts are particularly subtle in their 
variety, ranging from (1) casual chat to colleagues in a work break (often with some form 
of medias stimulus, whether websurfing or newspapers) to (2) broader discussion about 
‘issues’ (what one diarist called ‘putting the world to rights’) in a break from the 
workplace or on the journey home to (3) cases where talk was inherent to the work 
process itself (as with three of our diarists who respectively ran a beauty salon, managed 
a busy gasoline station, or ran a newsagents).  
 
The last type of case takes us closest to the sort of informal social setting that Katz and 
Lazarsfeld envisaged (1955: 10):  
[my newsagents’ shop is] like a small village shop, plus  . . . it’s in the city, you know? 
So, I’ve got no competition; mine is only shop on the road. So they all come and talk 
to me. They all what happened in their house and where they went and what they did 
and which cinema they been to or what theatre or what show they been, they always 
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ask me - and how you are and how was your day. So it was like a - in a small 
community, small town shop. (Pavarti, 51, newsagent, suburban West London) 
It is worth noting however that, by her own account, this diarist [phrase altered] tended 
not to offer her own opinion, so cannot qualify in Katz and Lazarsfeld’s terms as an 
opinion-former. 
 
Do such settings imply an element of regular group influence mediating the inputs from 
media themselves, as in Katz and Lazarsfeld’s study? That is ambiguous perhaps, 
particularly in work settings where part of the point of media-stimulated talk is simply to 
fill the time between work phases in a socially neutral way: 
I mean we’ll have conversations and it is always based on the newspaper. [the guys in 
the rostering department] . . . will come in and the main conversation is about the sport 
and you just talk about headline news and it’ll be like ‘What do you think?’ or ‘What 
did I think?’ Or perhaps I’ll bring in my Heat magazine and one of the lads will pick it 
up and be like ‘Whoah that's Kylie Minogue’ and it will branch off into ‘Oh look she’s 
getting married’. (Janet, 29, airport administrator, Northern suburb) 
Beyond the workplace, there were a range of accounts of the influence of social context 
on diarists’ opinions. Some took it as natural that their friends or family would be in 
agreement with them: 
That kept us going…I was discussing it with my friend as well, she was discussing 
with her friends, and you know everybody had the same opinion. (Pavarti) 
I was kind of meeting people that would agree with me and I suppose that cements 
your, once you know that other people feel the same way that you, I suppose it 
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cements your opinion (non-completing diarist, male, 29, administrator) 
Others, more rarely, made a point of demonstrating the independence of their views. 
 
An important factor in our study, raised vividly in Nina Eliasoph’s (1998) study of US 
everyday talk about politics, was constraints on raising public issues.  Sometimes this 
takes the form of a general exclusion of any ‘serious’ talk, for example when friends are 
on a night-out: 
I think all my friends, we’ve all got children now, so when we, we don’t see each 
other as much as we used to, still see each other quite a bit. So when we do go out, it’s 
more for the laugh and the social rather, whereas when we used to see each other a lot 
more, you’d probably get all spectrums of a conversation coming in. Whereas now, 
it’s all a bit more light hearted because we think, well I don’t see you that often, you 
don’t particularly want to be sitting there talking about doom and gloom that’s going 
on in the world. (Marie, 34, part-time accounts clerk, Midlands rural) 
More important to any potential process of opinion-formation are cases where even in a 
discussion about ‘issues’, people avoid certain issues, particularly ‘politics’. A number of 
our diarists mentioned this as normal, and some had naturalized it: ‘I don’t really want to 
be the sort of arrogant sort of having heated debates on it’ (Kylie). Or, looked at from the 
point of view of someone wanting others not to give her their opinions: 
My cynical friend would say that you know everybody should be obligated to know 
about politics and everybody should use their vote responsibly because he’s really into 
that . . . Whereas me,  . . .  I don’t know where my line would be because I know I 
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look at a lot of celebrity news but that’s not important and I wouldn’t say people were 
obliged to know about that at all.   (Beccy, 27, marketing executive, Northern suburb) 
But if it’s ‘arrogant’ to express a sharply differing opinion, or seen as ‘cynical’ by others 
to insist on being engaged and critical on public matters, then it is clear that the space of 
everyday discourse about pubic matters is significantly reduced. And this was exactly 
how some diarists who were consistently engaged in a world of public issues felt: 
They just don’t care.  This is what I find quite astonishing really that most people I 
know really just don’t care about what’s going on. They’re focused on their own thing 
and as long as they know that David Beckham’s had a new hair cut and that they can 
go and get it done at the salon just like this, and they just carry on with stuff (Josh, 23, 
architecture student, Northern suburb) 
I talk about Iraq with my partner, with my mum, sometimes, you know - but - you 
know, a lot of people around me are very materialistic and that’s just not on their 
minds.  . . . [I]  like to concentrate on reality - things - but a lot of people around me 
are more into their own lives than others that they never knew and are now getting 
killed 500,000 miles away. A lot of that, they don’t care about the war, but they just 
don’t make it a part of their lives. (Crystal, 22 unemployed, urban London southeast) 
The space of everyday talk about public issues, while significant, is clearly fractured in 
various ways that significantly qualify Katz and Lazarsfeld’s original thesis.   
 
Everyday debate 
 
 26
Such evidence of constraints on opinion formation – that is, constraints on the 
opportunities for people to influence each other on matters of public importance – must 
be set alongside plenty of evidence from our diarists that they had debates, and 
sometimes disagreements, and enjoyed them as part of everyday social interaction.  
 
While the volume of our data on this is too small to claim any broader significance for 
such a conclusion, there are hints that while family debates are open to everyone, 
opportunities for debates in more public settings (such as work or discussions with 
friends) are more open to those of higher social status: 
Yeah, um, I’m lucky in as much as that my wife, my wife’s sister and her husband 
very much politically minded.  So we have a lot of good debates (laughs) on various, 
yeah,  you know, various topics  . . .  it’s not just what my opinion, it’s just you know, 
you’re sort of sharing with people, like-minded people.   (Patrick, 52, warehouseman, 
Urban south) 
I enjoy conversation and vigorous debate [with friends], um, being aware of the 
topical issues and having people to discuss them with, having sounding-boards if you 
like. (Bill, 61, retired managing director, Midlands rural) 
I’ve discussed a lot at the magistrates.   . . . everyone has a cup of coffee and you have 
a chat and . . .  inevitably you lunch and generally talk to the people you’ve been 
sitting with. But you get a good cross section of views there cause there’s all sorts of 
people magistrates.  And it’s very interesting to hear people’s views. (Edwards, 64, 
retired financial services chief executive, Northern suburb) 
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In addition, we found, as expected, evidence of media stimulating debate which 
otherwise would not feature in local experience at all (for example talk about a rare 
disease shown on television or the debate opportunity afforded  by an online discussion 
group): 
Lots of people watched it [a human-interest television programme titled The Boy 
Whose Skin Fell Off], my friend, mum and me rang each other during the break.  Some 
of us talked about it for the next few days. (Sherryl, 30, deputy play-leader, Urban 
London southeast) 
I take part in a number of Internet discussion forums [on religion], where people from 
any part of the world can meet in what some call 'cyberspace' to discuss matters of 
mutual interest. This has the benefit of meeting people from all kinds of countries and 
backgrounds very easily . . .  A great way to learn from other people (Eric, 47, 
computer analyst and lay preacher, Urban London southeast) 
In this last example, we get a glimpse of opinion-formation occurring well outside the 
parameters of any social group, from unknown and unseen discussants. This is an 
obvious area where the model of Personal Influence needs to be extended. We must 
emphasise however that it was the only example of its sort in all our data, where online 
discussion was surprisingly absent overall – indeed this seems likely to prove a 
significant difference between our and the parallel US project run by Bruce Williams and 
Andrea Press. 
 
Summary  
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We have found some evidence therefore of the older forms of authority structure 
(particularly between male and female partners) persisting in what, as Katz and 
Lazarsfeld pointed out, is the highly gendered area of public issues. However, any 
assessment of opinion-formation overall in this area is constrained by evidence of the 
gaps in, and constraints upon, discussion and exchange of opinions on public matters, and 
particularly traditional politics. Unlike perhaps in the areas of fashion and cultural taste, 
the field of public discussion is limited as to who can regularly participate within it, and 
when and where. It is not an open space of discussion, still less of open opinion-
formation and deliberation.  
 
This last point is reinforced by another finding which moves us beyond Katz and 
Lazarsfeld’s concern with opinion-formation on specific issues. This is the question of 
action. Although we regularly asked diarists not only how they talked about the issues 
they mentioned but also what public actions, if any, they took or had taken, we found 
only one report in all our data of a discussion leading to public action. The case in point 
was perhaps our most locally engaged diarist who told us she got talking about trash 
recycling at a party, and then decided with her friends to lobby the local council to revise 
how they collected domestic trash. Our point however is that this link between talk and 
action was rare. This raises the wider question of how consequential opinion-formation 
on public issues is for wider democratic participation, even if it is greatly mediated by the 
opinions of those around us. Without a link between talk and action, surely, Katz and 
Lazarsfeld’s implicit link back to the liberalism of John Stuart Mill is potentially broken.  
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Conclusion 
 
[para altered] In concluding, we want to build on this last point, while noting the 
continuities with Katz and Lazarsfeld’s  model that our research still registers. In this 
article, we have used the findings of the LSE ‘Public Connection’ project to explore the 
extent to which Katz and Lazarsfeld’s account of opinion-formation through ‘personal 
influence’ in mid-20th century American remains pertinent, particularly in the area of 
public affairs.  
 
[para altered] Certainly, looking back, their emphasis on the priority of local social 
groups, from this distance, might suggest they had what Dennis Wrong (Wrong 1961) 
called an oversocialised conception of the citizen’s everyday life, that is, an account of 
the social world20 that exaggerates the degree to which individuals operate within a 
coherent and complete framework of social norms and values.  Media are of course now a 
source of opinion and reference that is pervasive to a degree that could not have been 
fully anticipated in the 1940s and 1950s, and in that radically changed environment some 
argue (Bennett and Manhiem, this volume) that the individualizing tendency of 
particularly narrowcast media fosters precisely the de-socialized context for infomation 
transmission that Touraine diagnosed. Our findings are, in some respects, rather different. 
Both talk and social expectations remain, according to our survey, importantly linked 
with engagement in a public world through media, and Katz and Lazarsfeld’s finding that 
there is a relation between the scale of people’s social interactions and their degree of 
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attention to public affairs has also been backed tentatively by the evidence of our diarist 
sample.  
 
[para altered] All this points to the continued salience of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s 
questions at least to warn us off the more drastic prognoses of the ‘desocialisation’ of 
contemporary life. Instead our concerns about the contemporary salience of Personal 
Influence’s argument  - the argument that, by identifying the social networks through 
which mass transmissions are interpersonally mediated, we have identified a mechanism 
that effectively embeds media in the processes that sustain liberal democracy – lie 
elsewhere. For, as our diary data suggests, the problem may be not the absence of a 
discursive context for our tracking of a public world through media; for that discursive 
context probably exists for most people. The problem, in Britain at least, is rather the lack 
of any link between that discursive context and any opportunities for doing anything 
effective about the issues we learn about through media. In that sense, the problem with 
contemporary democracy is larger than any study about the social mediation of media 
consumption can address. Does that mean that Katz and Lazarsfeld’s whole study is 
condemned to irrelevance? Quite the contrary – for it sustains our attention to one key 
term (talk) of a wider disarticulation that neither policymakers nor academics who care 
about the future of democracy can afford to ignore.  
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1
 Contrast for example Cantril (1940). 
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2
 As explained by Roger Silverstone (2005: 189): ‘mediation . . . requires us to understand how processes 
of communication change the social and cultural environments that support them as well as the 
relationships that participants, both individual and institutional, have to that environment and to each 
other’.  
3
 Sunstein’s (2001) well known critique of the internet’s consequences for democracy  can be interpreted in 
these terms. 
4
 See Martin-Barbero (1993), Couldry (2006: chapter 2). 
5
 For a useful review of the broader background associated with this position, see Simonson (1986). 
6
 See their comment (1955: 10) on the rise of the ‘beauty parlor’. 
7
 Compare the more directly media-related argument of Lazarsfeld and Merton (1969). 
8
 Cf Castells’ (1996: 477) comment that ‘the network society increasingly appears to most people as a 
meta-social disorder’. 
9
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Markham (forthcoming  2007) and  www.publicconnection.org .    
10
 Funded by the National Science Foundation. We appreciate the support and stimulation that Bruce 
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11
 In this sense, from the perspective of the UK at least, we are sceptical of the claim of Lance Bennett and 
Jarol Manheim (this volume) that in a TV age ‘inattentive participation [is] presumed’, unless we are 
discussing thoroughgoing  elite models of democracy masquerading as participative. However, as noted in 
the main text, neither have we investigated assumptions of continuous attention, but rather the assumption 
of something in-between continuous attention and inattention.  
12
 For a call for political research to be opened out in this way, see LeBlanc (1999); and for a defence of the 
contribution of self-produced data in media research, see Bird (2003). 
13
 There is also a precedent for diaries in Herbert Blumer’s early study of film audiences (cf more broadly 
Blumer 1969: 41). Thanks to Pete Simonson for reminding us of this precedent. 
14
 For much more detailed discussion see Couldry Livingstone and Markham (forthcoming 2007). 
15
 For interesting material on the internet’s contribution to debates about whether the disengagement of 
‘youth’ is principally a life-stage or a more profound generational shift, see Pew (2000) 
16
 Although there are unresolved debates about how precisely class can be measured, public debate in the 
UK has for a long  time drawn, and still does draw, on the distinction between ABC1 social categories 
(broadly, managerial, professional and administrative clases) and C2DE social categories (skilled manual 
workers, unskilled manual workers and unemployed). 
17
 After excluding those past retirement or without employment. 
18
 For an implicit link between our thinking on the project and a consideration of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s 
questions, see Couldry (2004: 22). 
19
 See respectively Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955: 324 and 314). 
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 Wrong’s particular target was Parsonian structural functionalism. 
